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How have the politics of banking crises changed over the long run? Unlike existing 
static accounts, we offer a dynamic theory emphasizing how the emergence of voters’ 
“great expectations” after the 1930s concerning crisis prevention and mitigation 
reshaped the politics of banking crises in many democratic countries. We argue that 
both variations over time, centered on the emergence of these expectations, and 
variations within democratic countries, based on how veto players constrain policy 
change, exerted an important influence on the propensity of voters to punish incumbent 
political parties in the aftermath of banking crises. We find strong support for our 
argument using a new dataset of 100 democratic countries from 1831 – 2011. Political 
punishment in the aftermath of a banking crisis is mainly a modern phenomenon and is 
most evident in systems with polarized veto players. 
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Recent financial crises have demonstrated once again that they often have dramatic 
political as well as economic consequences, including loss of office for many incumbent 
democratic governments. In the five years since 2007, incumbent political parties in those 
countries suffering banking crises lost office at a rate 70% higher than in the preceding five 
year period.1 Despite the apparently powerful impact of such crises on the ability of political 
elites to remain in power, disciplinary knowledge of the political aftermaths of financial 
crises is confined to narrow time periods and country and regional experiences (Bernhard and 
Leblang 2008, 2012; Bermeo and Pontusson 2012; Barreyre 2011; Broz 2013; Crespo-
Tenorio, Jensen and Rosas 2013; Eichengreen 1992; Frieden 1987; Gourevitch 1986; 
Haggard 2000; Hellwig and Coffey 2011; Kahler and Lake 2013; MacIntyre 2002; 
MacIntyre, Pempel and Ravenhill 2008; Pepinsky 2012; Simmons 1994).2 Much of this 
scholarship focuses on how political institutions and economic openness shape modern 
governments’ accountability for policy outcomes rather than how institutions shape policy 
change after crises. We show that there are large payoffs from taking a more panoramic 
historical view that emphasizes institutional constraints.3 
We offer a dynamic and conditional theory of the relationship between banking crises 
and the survival of incumbent political parties in democratic countries. We argue that since 
1 We discuss our data sources below. 
2 The literature investigating the political effects of financial crises generally only uses post-
1970 data and does not justify this choice on the grounds that the relationship between 
financial crises and politics might vary over time. Some literature on American political 
development has addressed the question of whether the incidence of economic voting in the 
United States has changed over time (e.g. Lin 1999; Lynch 1999; DeCanio 2006). 
3 On the importance of time in political analysis, see Pierson 2004. 
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the Second World War, the emergence of societal “great expectations” of government 
interventions to forestall economic depressions have sharply raised the stakes for political 
incumbents facing banking crises, a particularly acute form of financial crisis.4 The 
consequence has been that governments facing institutional obstacles to undertake such 
interventions during and after banking crises now suffer much greater levels of punishment 
than in the past and compared to their peers. Institutional constraints do feature in a number 
of relevant accounts, but they provide a static depiction of how voters perceive and react to 
such constraints (Haggard 2000; Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Oatley 2003). In contrast, we 
argue that the combination of changing societal expectations of government policy and 
variations within democratic countries, based on how veto players constrain policy change, 
have reshaped the survival prospects for incumbent governments over the long run.  
The first step in our argument is to outline why crisis-related political punishment is a 
modern phenomenon. Our second step is to outline why governments presiding over banking 
crises are often punished for reasons other than the bad economic outcomes that often follow 
crises. There are various possible such reasons. For instance, crises may signal incumbent 
incompetence in an era when so many governments have made promises to prevent them 
through policies such as prudential regulation. Improved economic knowledge has been a 
double-edged sword for politicians: postwar governments now stand a better chance than in 
the past of avoiding deep depressions – indeed, output losses following banking crisis were 
typically larger in the pre-war era (Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, Martinez-Peria and Rose 
2001; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009) – but this improvement in public policy has not generally 
4 Emphasizing the impact of great expectations concerning government economic policy 
responsibilities might be seen as mere conventional wisdom (Blyth 2002; Eichengreen 1992; 
Frieden 2006; Simmons 1994). However, its relevance for the political consequences of 
financial crises has not been systematically explored.  
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rewarded political incumbents facing such crises. We argue that this is because modern voters 
know that governments can intervene to mitigate crises and expect them to do so, and will not 
be forgiving if governments are institutionally constrained. We expect the same institutional 
constraints to have less political salience in the pre-war era where such expectations were less 
well developed and widely shared.  
We test our argument using a new dataset of 100 democratic countries since the early 
nineteenth century. We find strong support for our claims: the survival prospects for 
incumbent political parties in democratic countries are conditional on time and on 
institutional constraints. Political punishment in the aftermath of a banking crisis is mainly a 
modern phenomenon and is most evident in systems with polarized veto players.  
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next two sections examine the 
existing literature and outline our argument. We then present our methods, data and results. 
We conclude with some empirical illustrations of our argument and by discussing the 
implications of our theory and findings. 
 
THE LITERATURE 
Economists have focused heavily on the economic causes and aftermaths of financial 
crises, but have so far been unconcerned with their political consequences (Brunnermeier, 
Crockett, Goodhart, Persaud and Shin 2009; Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini 1998; Krugman 
1998; Laeven and Valencia 2010; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009; Schularick and Taylor 2012). A 
general political economy literature explores the relationship between economic crises and 
politics. This literature finds that recessions are usually bad news for political incumbents, 
though it assumes that such incumbents have various policy tools to mitigate this effect 
(Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, and Swagel 1992; Alesina and Rosenthal 1989; 1995; Clark, 
Golder, and Poast 2012; Edwards and Tabellini 1991). Since banking crises nevertheless tend 
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to be associated with comparatively deep and long recessions, voters may punish incumbents 
presiding over banking crises because they serve as “recessionary accelerators” (Jordà, 
Schularik, and Taylor 2012; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009).  
This recessionary accelerator mechanism is consistent with some claims made in the 
literature on economic voting, which finds empirical support for the relationship between 
economic and electoral performance in democratic countries.5 Although all schools in this 
literature see economic crises as bad news for incumbents, they do so for somewhat different 
reasons.  
The “retrospective voting” school contends that in elections voters prioritise outcomes 
and judge incumbents based on simple metrics of past economic performance, such as 
whether their economic situation has improved or worsened since the previous election 
(Fiorina 1981). A related school of thought associated with Achen and Bartels’ notion of 
“blind retrospection” is pessimistic about the ability of voters to understand and assess 
relevant economic facts and causal relationships, but still predicts punishment of incumbents 
for negative outcomes: “voters regularly punish governments for acts of God, including 
droughts, floods and shark attacks” (Achen and Bartels 2004, abstract ).  
The “prospective voting” school contends that voters are more rational and forward-
looking than the retrospective school assumes and that they assess the ability of competing 
candidates or parties to manage the economy in the future (Anderson 1995; Lewis-Beck 
1988; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992; Powell and Whitten 1993; Smith 2004). 
Assigning blame for past outcomes can be difficult for voters: policies that contribute to 
banking crises and economic performance more broadly are difficult to assess, making it hard 
to hold governments accountable for their onset (Keefer 2007, 608-9). Prospective voters 
should pay more attention to whether incumbents will be better than alternatives in mitigating 
5 For a review of this large literature, see Anderson 2007, 278-281. 
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the impact of crises and managing the economy in the future. The onset of a banking crisis 
may tarnish incumbents’ reputation for economic competence, as illustrated by the case of the 
British Labour government of 2007-10 (Barnes and Hicks 2012). 
While this literature has contributed to our understanding of how economic 
performance shapes democratic politics, we still know surprisingly little about the specific 
impact of financial crises. There has been little scrutiny of how voters respond to the role of 
institutions in shaping policy change after banking crises, compared to how institutions may 
serve as mechanisms for generating accountability of incumbent governments (Crespo-
Tenorio, Jensen and Rosas 2013; Pepinsky 2012). Even less attention has been paid to how 
the propensity of voters to punish incumbent governments might have changed over time 
(Duch and Stevenson 2008, 1-2).  
 
THE ARGUMENT 
An epochal shift in societal expectations concerning government responsibilities for 
preventing and mitigating financial crises has been the result of a number of related 
developments over the past century, including democratization, improvements in 
macroeconomic knowledge, new public policy commitments, and rising financial wealth. The 
experiences of the Great Depression and World War Two, the process of democratization, 
and the accumulation of economic knowledge in the first half of the twentieth century 
substantially raised voter expectations concerning government policy responsibilities for 
economic stabilization (Alesina and Rosenthal 1989, 382; Bailey 1964, 11; Berman 2006; 
Blyth 2002; Ruggie 1983; Eichengreen 1992; Frieden 2006; Ikenberry 1992; Krugman 2007; 
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Lin 1999; Lynch 1999, 2002; Simmons 1994).6 The perceived need for governments to 
manage financial markets in the broader public interest was particularly strong after the 
events of the early 1930s, prompting a variety of new regulations (Helleiner 1994, 25-50. See 
also Allen, Cope, Dark and Witheridge 1938; Busch 2009; Hall 1993). As one early 
commentator on America’s 1933 Banking Act argued, “the new law makes banking more of 
a social enterprise and increases the responsibility of the federal government for banking 
stability” (Preston 1933, 585). A more explicit example of innovative promises to voters 
regarding financial stabilization was contained in the 1950 British Labour Party manifesto, 
which proposed to “take whatever measures may be required to control financial forces, so as 
to maintain full employment and promote the welfare of the nation.”7  
The virtual absence of banking crises in the three decades after 1945 reinforced voter 
expectations of financial stability as a normal and politically achievable condition. Mass 
education and the media have also spread awareness of the possibilities of government 
stabilization policies. The material stake of voters in financial stabilization has also risen 
considerably since 1945 due to growing financial wealth and financial inclusiveness.8 The 
result is that despite (or even because of) the re-emergence of banking crises and a 
6 We are not claiming that macroeconomic interventions were non-existent or politically 
irrelevant before the mid-twentieth century, but they were far less frequent and extensive, 
particularly under the gold standard.  
7 http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/, accessed 12 November 2013. 
8 Financial crises are usually associated with sharp falls and higher volatility in asset prices. 
See Borio and Lowe 2002; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, chapter 10. 
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deregulatory trend in finance since the mid-1970s, most governments still accept and are seen 
as responsible for the maintenance of financial stability (Lavelle 2013).9  
The result of this sustained higher level of societal demand for financial stabilization 
since the mid-twentieth century is that modern governments and central banks must be seen 
not only to try to prevent financial crises, but also to undertake stabilization measures when 
they do occur. Prior to 1945, public intervention to stabilize banking systems was 
comparatively limited in magnitude and scope, reflecting “the more limited political 
pressures to provide it” (Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, Martinez-Peria and Rose 2001, 
71).10 By contrast, since then, “it is unthinkable that any government or central bank would 
now stand idly by and watch the closure of any of its major banks, the realization of large-
scale losses on the bank deposits of its citizens and the collapse of its financial markets, if the 
authorities could avoid such events” (Goodhart 1999, 356-357).  
However, the contemporary politics of financial stabilization are more complicated 
than this suggests. Extensive interventions in the wake of crises may have become routine, 
but they are controversial. The re-emergence of banking crises after the early 1970s has 
coincided with a process of rapid financial deregulation and deepening, and a striking 
increase in the size and complexity of both individual banks and banking systems in many 
countries.11 In the case of the UK, for example, bank assets as a percentage of GDP rose from 
9 For UK evidence, see BBC World Service 2009, and in the Netherlands, see van der 
Cruijsen, de Haan, Jansen, and Mosch 2013. On the general persistence of demands for 
welfare despite deregulation, see Newman and Jacobs 2010. 
10 On the modest pre-war interventions in Britain, France, and the United States, see 
Kindleberger and Aliber 2011, 213-228; Taus 1943; and Wood 2005. 
11 Among the extensive literature on this topic, see Alessandri and Haldane 2009, Johnson 
and Kwak 2010. 
 9 
                                                 
an average of about 50% over 1880-1970 to 200% in 1980 and over 500% by 2000. One 
consequence is that during crises “there has been a dramatic expansion in both the scale and 
scope of state liquidity insurance to the banking system” (Alessandri and Haldane 2009, 5).12 
This trend has been widely interpreted in the media and by voters as favouring the interests of 
financial firms and the relatively wealthy, even if governments and central banks feel they 
have no choice but to prevent banking systems from collapsing (Keefer 2007; Rosas 2009). 
Thus, opinion surveys often report mixed attitudes: voters strongly distrust “bankers” and are 
less willing to support “bank bailouts”, but they generally remain robustly in favour of 
government intervention to prevent generalized financial and economic collapse (Gallup 
2009). 
These developments have important implications for the propensity of voters to 
punish incumbent governments presiding over banking crises. Firstly, given the substantial 
increase in the demand for policies to promote financial stability in the postwar era, the 
propensity of voters to punish governments presiding over crises should have increased 
compared to the past. Such crises may be a product of unfortunate circumstances, bad policy, 
or more likely some combination of both, but it will be difficult for most voters accurately to 
determine causation. Thus, a simpler decision rule is more plausible in an era when all 
governments try to meet societal demands for financial stability: punish incumbents when 
banking crises occur.  
Second, rising societal demands for intra-crisis stabilization measures mean that 
institutional obstacles to policy responses become more politically salient. As Rosas (2006:9) 
observes, “The heightened attention that the mass media tend to place on banking crises, and 
their direct economic effects on citizens, all but guarantee that the main features of 
government response, if not the exact details, will turn into a salient political issue.” 
12 For cross-country data, see Laeven and Valencia 2012. See also Pontusson and Raess 2012.  
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Governments will be especially vulnerable to punishment for failing take adequate 
stabilization measures – but why would any government choose such a path?  
We build on some existing accounts by highlighting how the presence of polarized 
veto players can produce policy gridlock in responding to banking crises (Alesina and Drazen 
1991; Crespo-Tenorio, Jensen and Rosas 2013, 9; Tsebelis 2002). Haggard finds that multiple 
veto players can limit the ability of governments to respond effectively to economic shocks 
(Haggard 2000; Haggard and Kaufman 1992).13 Similarly, Oatley finds stabilization after 
inflationary crises is delayed in democracies with highly polarized veto players, but more 
rapidly achieved in environments where such institutional obstacles are absent (Oatley 2003). 
MacIntyre argues that countries with a low dispersal of veto authority can suffer from the 
different problem of excessive policy volatility during crises, and thus posits a U-shaped 
relationship between the number of veto players and the costs of financial crises (MacIntyre 
2002). However, we expect voters to respond more negatively to readily observable policy 
gridlock than to excessive policy activism in an age of great societal expectations. Indeed, we 
fail to uncover a U-shaped relationship between banking crises, the number of veto players, 
and incumbent survival (see Appendix).  
We apply the same logic concerning voter judgement of policy outcomes as for the 
attribution of blame. One might expect modern voters to inflict greater punishment on 
governments that choose deliberately not to intervene than on those governments that face 
constraints in doing so. Again, however, voters will likely find it difficult to discern how 
much a bad policy outcome is truly beyond the control of the incumbent government and how 
much it is due to choice or incompetence. While high dispersal of veto authority may blur 
13 Veto players may also weaken the quality of financial regulation, particularly in developing 
country democracies, by limiting executive control over who is appointed to regulate the 
financial system (Satyanath 2006). 
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responsibility, in an era when societal demands for financial stability are intense, voters are 
less likely to forgive bad policy outcomes even if governments are institutionally constrained. 
Thus, voters may choose to punish incumbents for bad policy outcomes irrespective of their 
apparent source.14  
It is also possible that the number of veto players will affect the kinds of post-crisis 
policy interventions that governments choose, shaping voters’ perceptions of political 
incumbents. However, a number of studies find no evidence to support this conjecture 
(Grossman and Woll 2013; Keefer 2007; Rosas 2009). Therefore, we expect banking crises to 
have a larger negative impact on incumbent survival in political systems with more veto 
players in the post-war era. 
 
DATA AND METHOD 
To test our argument we use a new long-term historical database from 1831 to 2011. 
We provide our sample and summary statistics in the Appendix. 
We follow others in constructing a yearly indicator of “incumbent spells” based on 
the partisan affiliation of the chief executive (Crespo-Tenorio, Jensen, and Rosas 2013). This 
Partisan spells indicator measures when incumbent political parties, not individual leaders, 
lose office. It allows us to take into account institutional features, such as term limits and 
fixed vs. endogenous electoral cycles, which would otherwise make comparison between 
14 For a similar argument, see Healy and Malhotra 2013, 296. We also apply this logic to 
potential “external constraints” on policy responses such as financial openness or IMF 
conditionality, which some authors argue are relevant (Crespo-Tenorio, Jensen and Rosas 
2013; Hellwig 2007). It will be difficult for voters to judge the seriousness of such 
constraints: capital controls can be re-introduced, and incumbents may be using the IMF as a 
scapegoat.  
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parliamentary and presidential regimes difficult. The Appendix provides coding rules and 
data sources. 
The exact timing of a Banking crisis is difficult to ascertain, so we follow convention 
in measuring the incidence of crises by country-year. We code a country-year as “1” when an 
incumbent spell experiences a banking crisis and “0” otherwise, with some spells 
experiencing multiple crises. Our primary banking crisis measure is from Reinhart and 
Rogoff (R&R), who provide the most comprehensive data on crises since the early nineteenth 
century (Reinhart and Rogoff 2008). The R&R measure offers an expansive definition that 
identifies banking crises as occurring whenever there is any distress in the banking system. 
Since it therefore includes “non-systemic” banking crises, this should make it more difficult 
to uncover a positive relationship between crises and political turnover. In our sample the 
R&R measure yields 113 crises spread over 304 years across 56 democratic countries from 
1831 to 2010. We observe 45 crises in 17 countries in the pre-war period and 67 crises in the 
full sample in the post-war period. Crises were rare in the post-war period until the mid-
1970s (only three crises spread over four years across three countries) after which they 
occurred more frequently and with longer duration. Overall, the R&R measure yields 63 
crisis-years in the pre-war period and 241in the post-war period. 
As a robustness check, we also use a narrower alternative measure of the onset of a 
banking crisis from Laeven and Valencia (L&V) (Laeven and Valencia 2010). This measure, 
which extends from 1970 to 2011, excludes non-systemic banking system distress but covers 
nearly twice as many countries as the R&R dataset (100 in our sample). It yields 205 crisis-
years in total arising from 46 crises. Our focus on democratic countries leads us to restrict our 
analysis to those governments where the Polity IV measure of democracy is above 5 for the 
full incumbent spell. This leaves us with 729 partisan spells when we use the R&R sample, of 
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which 161 experienced a crisis (22.1%), and 717 spells when we use the L&V sample, of 
which 103 (14.4%) experienced a crisis.  
Figure 1 shows the basic structure of our data for the cases of Britain and Germany. 
The high shaded bars represent banking crises using both measures and the low cross-hatched 
bars indicate the commencement of new partisan spells during democratic periods. The low 
unfilled bars portray changes in the holder of executive power during non-democratic 
periods. We see two partisan spell terminations in Britain (1974, 2010) and three in Germany 
(1925, 1926, 2009) during a banking crisis. 
To assess whether veto players condition the effect of banking crises on incumbent 
survival, we use the Political Constraints Index Dataset (Henisz 2013). Based on a simple 
spatial model of political interaction, this index captures the number of independent actors 
with veto power and the distribution of political preferences across those actors. It ranges 
from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating a greater number of veto players with distinct 
political preferences.15 We create an interaction term that combines the effect of a banking 
crisis with our measure of veto players. This interaction term permits us to assess the 
conditional effect of banking crises across various levels of veto players on the expected rate 
of incumbency survival. 
15 This measure of political constraints differs substantially from the “Checks” measure 
provided in the Database of Political Institutions (Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer and Walsh 
2001). Unlike the Political Constraints Index, Checks assumes a simple linear relationship 
between additional independent vetoes and executive constraints (see Henisz 2004). In 
addition, Checks is only available from 1975 and thus does not permit a panoramic analysis. 
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Figure 1. Banking Crises and Partisan Spell Terminations in Britain and Germany, 1831 – 2011. 
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The high shaded bars indicate banking crisis-years and the low cross-hatched bars indicate new partisan spells during democratic periods. The low unfilled bars represent 
changes in the holder of executive power during non-democratic periods. 
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 We include control variables for degree of democracy, executive-dominated regimes, 
economic growth, GDP per capita, annual inflation rate, and the cumulative number of crisis-
years. We use the cumulative democracy score from Polity IV, which runs from 6 to 10, with 
higher values indicating greater democracy (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2011). We control 
for executive dominance because “clarity of policy responsibility” arguments suggest that it 
will easier for voters to assign blame to incumbents in such systems (Crespo-Tenorio, Jensen 
and Rosas 2013; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Powell and Whitten 1993). Conversely, such 
systems may have stronger incumbency advantages because the survival prospects of the 
chief executive do not depend on parliamentary coalition partners. We classify a political 
system as Executive-dominated if our partisan spell coding rules identify the chief executive 
as a president. The Maddison project and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
provide data on economic growth. Growth is a crucial control variable since we seek to 
account for its confounding effect on banking crisis onset and partisan spell termination. 
However, since banking crises usually create or amplify economic downturns, this variable 
could be seen as post-treatment variable that should not be included in the model – an issue 
we discuss later. Data on GDP per capita from the Maddison project and Penn’s World 
Tables are included to control for the level of development. We also include inflation data 
from Reinhart and Rogoff and the IMF’s International Financial Statistics on the grounds that 
high inflation might be associated with regime instability, though data limitations preclude us 
from including this variable in models in the pre-war era. 
Collinearity between veto players and democracy could compromise our results. Veto 
players and democracy, though analytically distinct, are highly correlated empirically.16 As 
part of our robustness checks we therefore use residualization by regressing Veto Players on 
16 The correlation between Veto Players and Democracy is nearly 0.80. 
 17 
                                                 
Democracy and then saving the residuals. The residuals, which have no correlation with 
democracy, capture the variation in veto players that is not explained by democracy. We 
replace Veto Players with these residuals and re-estimate the model, which enables us to 
estimate the unbiased effect of veto players (Clarke and Stone 2008, 389). 
We estimate a series of Cox proportional hazard models that model the expected 
length of a partisan spell for an incumbent party. Since we emphasize how changes over 
calendar time (i.e. years elapsed since 1831) shape the occurrence of partisan spell 
termination within a country – an event that occurs more than once – we use a conditional 
elapsed time model with stratification (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).17 This model is 
capable of addressing the possibilities that partisan spells develop sequentially and that their 
timing is different across occurrences (or strata).18 We test for non-proportional hazards and, 
where appropriate, we use smoothing methods to capture potential nonlinearity in the 
covariates (Keele 2010). We use simulations to interpret our findings (King, Tomz and 
Wittenberg 2000; Gandrud 2013).  
 
RESULTS 
We first estimate models that use the complete long-run data set from 1831 to 2010. 
Table 1 provides the results in the form of coefficients for different models of incumbency 
17 As opposed to gap time, which examines the likelihood of an event occurring since the last 
event, elapsed time allows us to frame our results as how likely a partisan spell termination is 
in a specific year.  
18 Hausmann tests indicate the baseline hazard varies across each stratum, which supports our 
model specification. When we account for unobserved heterogeneity by adding a country-
specific frailty term to the model, we find the estimated frailty parameter to be insignificant, 
with plots of the frailty estimates showing no significant variation across countries. 
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survival in both periods. Positive coefficient values suggest an upward shift in the hazard 
value (i.e., an incumbent party faces greater risk of partisan spell termination). Negative 
coefficient values imply the reverse.  
Considerable caution is warranted when interpreting interaction effects in nonlinear 
models. A significant coefficient on the interaction term is “neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition” for identifying the presence of a substantively important interactive relationship 
(Berry, DeMerritt and Esarey 2010, 25). The preferred method to interpret the effect of 
interaction terms is through graphical presentation of the relationship between changes in the 
variables constituting the interaction term and the outcome of interest (Brambor, Clark, and 
Golder 2006). We therefore plot the simulated marginal effect of a banking crisis as the veto 
player variable (or its residual) varies from its observed minimum to its maximum values; the 
median line summarizes the central tendency from the simulations. The ribbon represents the 
middle 95% of 1,000 simulations and the density of the ribbon indicates the set of values with 
the highest probability. The plots also include a histogram of the distribution of the veto 
player variable (or its residual).  
Figure 2, which uses the results from Model 1, shows that banking crises have a 
substantive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of partisan spell termination 
for high values of Veto Players. The histogram shows that there are a sizeable number of 
observations that fall in the range of statistical significance. The Appendix reports similar 
figures when we use Model 2. Thus, the effect of banking crises on partisan spell termination 
is conditional on the veto player environment.  
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Table 1. Banking Crises and Partisan Spell Termination, 1831 – 2011.  
============================================================================================================== 
                         Model 1    Model 2    Model 3   Model 4   Model 5    Model 6    Model 7    Model 8     
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Banking Crisis             -0.74       0.17      2.49     -0.18      -0.77       0.43 **    0.16       0.47 **                      
                           (0.58)     (0.15)    (4.47)    (1.15)     (0.61)     (0.18)     (0.58)     (0.18)    
                      
Veto Players               -1.53 ***            -1.60                -2.23 ***             -0.68                
                           (0.54)               (2.17)               (0.54)                (0.50)  
  
Banking Crisis *            2.37 *              -5.49                 3.09 **               0.80                                   
Veto Players               (1.31)               (9.47)               (1.47)                (1.32)               
 
Democracy                   0.00      -0.03     -0.08     -0.09       0.17 *     0.13       0.01       0.00     
                           (0.05)     (0.05)    (0.09)    (0.14)     (0.10)     (0.10)     (0.07)     (0.07)    
 
Executive Dominance        -0.60 ***  -0.60 ***                      -0.55 **   -0.55 **   -0.54 ***  -0.54 *** 
                           (0.19)     (0.19)                         (0.24)     (0.25)     (0.16)     (0.16)    
 
Growth                     -0.02      -0.02     -0.10 *** -0.09 ***    ^   **     ^   **   -0.03 **   -0.03 **                                  
                           (0.02)     (0.02)    (0.03)    (0.03)                           (0.01)     (0.01)           
 
GDP per capita (ln)        -0.29 **   -0.29 **  -5.26 *** -5.13 ***  -0.30 *    -0.31 *    -0.10      -0.10                        
                           (0.14)     (0.14)    (0.81)    (0.74)     (0.17)     (0.17)     (0.11)     (0.11)    
 
Inflation (ln)                                                        0.15 *     0.14 *     0.05       0.05                         
                                                                     (0.09)     (0.08)     (0.06)     (0.06)                       
                                
Cumulative Crises           0.00       0.00     -0.20 **  -0.20 ***  -0.01      -0.01      -0.03      -0.03                         
                           (0.02)     (0.02)    (0.08)    (0.07)     (0.02)     (0.02)     (0.03)     (0.03)    
                       
Veto Player Residual                  -1.53 ***           -2.18                 -2.18 ***             -0.64     
                                      (0.54)              (2.29)                (0.53)                (0.50)    
 
Banking Crisis *                       2.43                1.62                  2.85 *                0.51             
Veto Player Residual                  (1.49)              (7.22)                (1.67)                (1.39)           
  
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Events                    493        493       148       148        323        323        422        422        
Observations             2844       2844       689       689       1997       1997       2326       2326        
=============================================================================================================== 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Splines (not shown) are included for Growth (Models 5 and 6). 
Models 1 – 6 use the R&R banking crisis measure. Models 7 and 8 use the L&V banking crisis measure. 
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Figure 2. Marginal Effect of Banking Crisis(R&R) on Partisan Survival Conditional on Veto Players, 1831- 
2010. 
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Yet Figure 2 obscures as much as it reveals. Indeed, if one focussed solely on 
variations in the veto player environment, one would erroneously conclude that this 
conditional relationship was static. Our theory leads us to suspect it is not; rather, the 
relationship between banking crises, partisan spell termination and veto players should be 
conditional on time. To investigate this we subset the data into two time periods: 1831 – 1938 
and 1946 – 2010.19 We then re-estimate Models 1 and 2 across these different subsets using 
the R&R data, and then re-estimate the same models using the L&V data for 1970 – 2011. 
We then plot the simulated marginal effect by using the results from Models 3, 6, and 9.  
Figures 3, 4, and 5 provide evidence that is consistent with our argument that, in 
combination, veto players and societal expectations shape the propensity for voters to punish 
incumbent parties in the aftermath of a banking crisis. Figure 3 shows that in the pre-war era 
that banking crises have a negative, though insignificant, effect on partisan spell termination 
for high values of Veto Players. Indeed, for this era we find no evidence that voters punish 
incumbents for banking crises. Crises appear not to be very salient for voters during this time, 
consistent with the prevailing “lower expectations.”20 
 
 
19 Our findings are unchanged if we exclude the early-postwar period (1946-1973) in which 
banking crises were virtually absent. While our findings are unchanged when we do include 
it, we exclude Executive dominance from the pre-war period since the United States is only 
democratic executive-dominated system in our sample.  
20 This result is unlikely to be due to restrictions on suffrage. Restrictions on male suffrage 
were present for a short time period in only four of the 17 countries in our pre-war sample: 
the United States (1832 – 1859), the UK (1880 – 1917), Belgium (1853 – 1892), and Canada 
(1888 – 1899). 
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 Figure 3. Marginal Effect of Banking Crisis (R&R) on Partisan Survival Conditional on Veto Players, 1831- 
1938. 
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Figure 4. Marginal Effect of Banking Crisis(R&R) on Partisan Survival Conditional on Veto Players, 1946 - 
2010. 
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Figure 5. Marginal Effect of Banking Crisis (L&V) on Partisan Survival Conditional on Veto Players, 1970 - 
2011. 
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We also considered the 1919 – 1938 period alone, but our model specifications in 
Table 1 would not converge due to the reduction in observations (294) and partisan spell 
terminations (78). The results obtained by excluding some variables suggest that there is a 
weak but insignificant positive conditional relationship between crises and Veto Players (or 
its residual) in the interwar period. This leads us to conclude that the interwar period is a 
transitional era, and that the main expectational shift occurs after 1945.  
Figures 4 and 5 show the conditional relationship between crises and veto players in 
the postwar era to be positive and significant when we use both the R&R and L&V data. The 
Appendix reports similar figures when we use other models from Table 1. Risk ratios, which 
compare the estimated hazard rate of governments experiencing a crisis against the hazard 
rate of governments that do not experience a crisis (“tranquil”), also provide a sense of the 
magnitude of the effect plotted in Figures 4 and 5. When comparing two post-war 
governments in a “high” veto player environment, the one experiencing a banking crisis 
(according to the R&R measure) is 2.9 [1.41, 6.19] times more likely to suffer a partisan spell 
termination than a government in a tranquil environment, and 1.8 [1.04, 3.36] times more 
likely using the L&V measure (95% confidence intervals in brackets).21 However, we find no 
significantly elevated termination risk when a crisis hits governments in “low” veto player 
environments. This result is consistent with our argument that after the Great Depression, 
increasingly demanding voters punish incumbent governments suffering from policy gridlock 
in the wake of crises. A Chow test to investigate the structural stability of the veto player  
 
 
21 “High” and “low” values of the veto players variable correspond to the 95th and 5th 
percentiles in the sample (all other covariates are held constant at their mean).  
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coefficient across time periods shows the test statistic to be significant, which is consistent 
with this argument.22 
It is worth noting that voters do appear consistently responsive to growth performance 
before and after the structural break: banking crises may have relatively low political salience 
before the mid-twentieth century, but voters did respond negatively to growth downturns. 
Table 1 reports a negative and significant coefficient for the effect of growth in the pre-war 
era, while a plot of the spline fit reveals a convex relationship in the post-war era with the 
range of statistical significance limited to stronger growth. This result is consistent with 
earlier work on pre-World War II voting behavior in the United States (Alesina and 
Rosenthal 1995; Lin 1999; Lynch 1999) and with arguments that recessions can produce 
widespread disaffection even if voters lack modern policy understandings and expectations 
(Achen and Bartels 2004). It could be that banking crises raise the likelihood of loss of office 
for political incumbents during the pre-war period because they act as recession accelerators. 
However, we remain sceptical of this possibility because we find crises are still unrelated to 
incumbent survival when growth is excluded from the model (see Appendix).  
We also find some evidence that wealthier countries tend to experience a lower risk of 
partisan spell termination in both time periods. When we use the R&R measure, there is 
evidence that inflation heightens the risk of partisan spell termination in the post-war period. 
Some institutional features, such as executive dominance, prolong the length of a partisan 
spell, suggesting presidential and semi-presidential systems may have some incumbency 
advantages relative to parliamentary systems. The coefficients in Table 1 also suggest that 
voters are less likely during the pre-1945 period to punish incumbents as the cumulative 
22 The test statistics are χ2 (6)= 17.65 (p<.01) using Veto Players and χ2 (6) = 18.02 (p<.01) 
using Veto Players residuals.  
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number of crisis-years rises. Although it seems implausible that voters would reward 
incumbents for serial crises, it underlines the point that banking crises by themselves do not 
reduce the survival prospects of governments before 1945.  
 
Endogenous Selection in Banking Crises 
It could be argued that our estimates are biased because they fail to adjust for the 
endogenous selection of governments into banking crises. Chief executives could potentially 
influence the economy or regulate the financial system in ways that induce or forestall a 
banking crisis, or some political systems may encourage financial instability. Economic and 
political conditions, such as growth and democracy, may make countries more prone to 
banking crises.  
Even if our results are unbiased, they are probably heavily dependent on modelling 
assumptions. If regimes that suffer banking crises differ systematically on observed 
covariates from those that do not, then this introduces problems of covariate balance and 
covariate overlap. We find imbalance to exist for three covariates for the R&R measure in the 
post-war era only – growth, democracy, and inflation –and for three covariates for the L&V 
measure – growth, inflation, and cumulative crisis-years. Using both crisis measures we find 
incumbent spells that eventually experience a banking crisis start with significantly lower 
growth and higher inflation than crisis-free spells. In addition, we find that R&R crisis spells 
start with a lower degree of democracy, and L&V crisis spells start with more cumulative 
crisis-years.  
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We use entropy balancing to achieve covariate balance in our sample (Hainmueller 
2012).23 Diagnostics are provided in the Appendix. While the means are perfectly balanced 
between crisis and tranquil incumbent spells, some minor imbalance remains in variance and 
skewness. We thus include all of the control variables in our estimation.  
As the weights obtained from the entropy balance estimation change across country 
panels, we are unable to use an elapsed time repeated events Cox model.24 We opt for a  
Poisson model (which can account for repeated events) and use cubic polynomials to account 
for temporal dependence.25 We provide the coefficients from the models in the Appendix. 
23 Entropy balancing has the advantage of not losing unmatched observations, which is why 
we opted for it over coarsened exact matching. However, entropy balancing does not solve 
selection on unobservables, which would necessitate instrumental variables-based (IV) 
estimation. We do not know of a term that satisfies the exclusion restriction of IV – that is, a 
covariate that strongly affects the probability of a banking crisis but that, conditional on the 
other regressors, does not affect incumbent survival. When the exclusion restriction is not 
satisfied, IV estimation will produce estimates that are both inconsistent and inefficient, and 
thus should be avoided.  
24 We are also unable to use a logit model since it would capture conditional gap time rather 
than elapsed time.  
25 While the Cox model makes no parametric assumptions about the baseline hazard, the 
Poisson model, which models the rate of events per observation time, is a form of a hazard 
model that assumes homogenous risk over time.  The data do not show evidence of 
overdispersion, which is why we opt a Poisson model over a negative binomial model. Since 
the Poisson model is a log-linear model, we add a constant (one) to all observations such that 
the absence of an event is recoded as zero.  
29 
 
                                                 
Table 2. Simulated Partisan Spell Termination Rates Using Entropy Balancing.  
 
 
 
Value 
 
R&R Crisis Measure L&V Crisis Measure 
 
Veto Players 
 
Veto Players Residual 
 
Veto Players 
 
Veto Players Residual 
Low 1.15 
[0.95, 1.48) 
1.15 
[0.95, 1.54) 
1.12 
[0.95, 1.51] 
 
1.12 
[0.95, 1.44] 
 
High 1.36 ** 
[1.07, 1.87] 
1.38 ** 
[1.07, 1.91] 
1.17 ** 
[1.01, 1.48] 
1.19 ** 
[1.01, 1.50] 
 
The quantities report the median simulated termination rate comparing crisis and tranquil countries. 95% 
confidence intervals are in brackets.  ** indicate significance at the 95% confidence level. 
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 Table 2 reports the simulated expected rate of partisan spell terminations per year as 
Veto Players takes on high and low values.   The results from entropy balancing confirm that 
banking crises have a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of partisan spell 
termination for high values of Veto Players when we use either the R&R or L&V measure.  
For both measures we expect at least one partisan spell termination per year for governments 
in high veto player environments facing a crisis (1.36 for the R&R measure; 1.17 for the 
L&V measure).  We do not find expected rates to be statistically significant for governments 
in low veto player environments facing a crisis.   We obtain similar results when we use 
residualization. Overall, these results are consistent with our argument that voters inflict 
greatest punishment on governments experiencing crises in the context of higher institutional 
constraints. 
 
Recession Accelerator or Competence Shock? 
 Can we be sure that banking crises have a conditional impact on incumbent survival 
that is distinct from their impact on the economic cycle? Isolating the treatment effect of 
crisis from growth is challenging since growth is both a confounding and a post-treatment 
variable. To deal with this, we exclude crisis-years with output losses and create new crisis 
measures that capture only those crisis-years that do not coincide with a recession.26 Since 
1946 there have been 172 crisis-years without a recession using the R&R measure and 129 
26 Using sensitivity analysis, we judged causal mediation - a method of decomposing causal 
effects (Imai, Keele, Tingley, and Yamamoto 2011) - to be insufficiently robust to warrant 
the strong assumptions necessary for its use.  
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crisis-years using the L&V measure.27 These instances can aid in disentangling the treatment 
effect of crises from growth, though for reasons we outline below, some caution is warranted. 
When we use these new measures, the results indicate that veto players have a similar 
conditional effect to that identified above (see Appendix). Figures 6 and 7 show the positive 
effect on the likelihood of partisan spell termination of a banking crisis remains statistically 
significant for high values of Veto Players for R&R and L&V crisis-years without a 
recession. For the R&R measure, we find governments in high veto player environments 
facing crises without a recession to be 4.3 [1.74, 11.60] times more likely to suffer a partisan 
spell termination than governments in tranquil environments. The L&V measure generates a 
risk ratio of 2.3 [1.09, 4.88] for the same comparison. For both crisis measures the confidence 
intervals for risk ratios in high and low veto player environments do not fully overlap. These 
risk ratios are higher than in our general results, but we are cautious about over-interpreting 
the magnitude of these effects since voters may also be reacting to output losses in previous 
years. The Appendix reports similar conditional effects when we use residualization.  
This result is suggestive that the conditional effects of high vetoes on incumbent 
survival prospects are not only due to the (normally) recessionary impact of banking crises; 
modern voters also inflict political punishment for other reasons. Our interpretation is that in 
an era of great expectations the onset of banking crises will generally erode the reputation of 
incumbent governments for economic competence, but that incumbents will find it 
particularly difficult to retain office when high vetoes mean that they cannot take decisive 
crisis mitigation actions that might help to restore their competency reputations.28 In short, in 
27 See also Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, Martinez-Peria, and Rose (2001, 60), who find 
that no recession accompanied about a quarter of crises since 1973. 
28 For an alternative view, see Keefer 2007. 
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Figure 6. Marginal Effect of Banking Crisis (R&R) without Recession on Partisan Survival Conditional on Veto 
Players, 1946- 2010. 
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Figure 7. Marginal Effect of Banking Crisis (L&V) without Recession on Partisan Survival Conditional on Veto 
Players, 1970 - 2011. 
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a world of great expectations, governments are expected both to prevent and to mitigate 
financial shocks; voters’ judgments about competency take both into account. 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
We have provided a range of evidence supporting our claim that there is a structural 
break in the mid-twentieth century in the relationship between banking crises and the survival 
prospects of incumbent governments. We have shown that contrary to the claims of the blind 
retrospection school and its critics, banking crises in the pre-1945 era (in contrast to 
economic recessions) were not associated with increased partisan turnover, either generally or 
in particular institutional contexts. Despite their considerable frequency and virulence in this 
period, such crises had much less salience for voters than is often assumed. 
This can be illustrated by the banking crises that affected the United States and 
Canada in 1907, where incumbent political parties had been in power for nearly a decade. 
Government policy responses in both countries were very limited by post-1945 standards, 
including in the United States where the crisis was most virulent.29 Sharp recessions ensued 
in 1908, when GDP fell by 4.7% in Canada and by 8.2% in the United States. Despite this, 
neither incumbent political party lost power in the 1908 elections held in both countries. In 
the United States, the Republicans retained power until the 1912 election. In Canada, the 
incumbent Liberals retained office until October 1911.  
All this changed after 1945 because, we have argued, voters in many countries 
became increasingly demanding of governments as regards economic and financial 
29 The United States had no central bank at this time and the private sector, led by J. Pierpont 
Morgan, undertook modest stabilization (Bruner and Carr 2007). The private sector led a 
similar effort in Canada (Conant 1927: 469-471).  
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stabilization. The consequence has been that although the diffusion of macroeconomic and 
financial stabilization policy techniques and tools meant that after the interwar period the 
onset of financial crises became somewhat less likely and more easily mitigated, rising 
societal expectations regarding crisis prevention and management eroded the political 
benefits for incumbent governments. Paradoxically, rising societal expectations regarding 
crisis prevention, management and mitigation have meant that political incumbents are now 
much more vulnerable than in the past, particularly when institutional constraints are present.  
A high number of veto players need not prevent policy action, but it often does lead 
governments to act differently than they would have in a low veto-player environment. The 
contrasting responses and electoral fates of incumbent centre-right parties in the United States 
and Sweden following the recent financial crisis are illustrative. Bermeo and Pontusson 
conclude that whereas in the United States elite polarization and supermajoritarian features of 
the political system “profoundly shaped (and hampered)” the policy response after January 
2008, in Sweden “elite consensus facilitated a swift and effective crisis response” (Bermeo 
and Pontusson 2012, 15, emphasis added ). The Republicans were heavily defeated in the 
2008 presidential elections, but for the first time in a century Swedish voters in 2010 returned 
to power a centre-right government that had served a full term.  
The comparison between the political impact of the 2007-8 crisis and that of a century 
earlier is consistent with our general findings that in the modern era the number of veto 
players is important even when we account for executive dominance, and that banking crises 
are politically consequential not just because they are recession accelerators. In an era of 
great expectations, crises are most likely to induce punishment when incumbents’ diminished 
reputations for economic competence are further undermined by a perceived inability to take 
measures consistent with economic stabilization. 
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Our panoramic approach has the advantage of revealing the crucial importance of 
time-dependent processes, including the impact of policy learning both by elites and, just as 
importantly, by society at large. It also allows us to assess the comparative institutional 
claims found in the existing literature in a wider context. We have shown that the clarity of 
responsibility effect is less important than is often supposed and that modern voters appear 
more responsive to institutional constraints placed on the chief executive’s ability to initiate 
policy after a crisis. 
The main theoretical implication of our findings is that partisan survival in the face of 
financial crises is not only affected by the institutional and material factors that have received 
most attention in the literature. As we have shown, unless longer-term processes are taken 
into account, notably changing societal expectations regarding the policy responsibilities of 
government, we risk missing the bigger picture. From a panoramic perspective, we can see 
that the sharp rise in societal expectations after the experience of the Great Depression was a 
precondition for institutional factors that shape the ability of governments to respond to crises 
to become important. So, too, it is the combination of rising societal understanding of and 
expectations regarding government policy with rising average material stakes in economic 
and financial stabilization that triggers a pressing concern for voters: that governments 
respond effectively when financial crises occur to mitigate their consequences for incomes, 
employment and wealth. Governments that fail to do so, and who thus risk repeating the 
catastrophic socio-economic outcomes of the interwar period, are the most likely of all to 
suffer punishment. In short, it is only through a more dynamic, long run perspective that the 
full significance of institutional and changing material factors can be properly appreciated. 
This points to the need to investigate the impact of changing expectations of government in 
many other areas of interest to political scientists. 
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If rising societal expectations of government economic policy responsibilities are as 
important as we have argued, do they represent an “iron cage” for incumbent governments in 
the modern era? Politicians may respond by attempting to deflect blame to others and by 
trying to reshape and lower societal expectations about the possibilities of government 
stabilization measures. As regards blame deflection, Tulis argues that since the beginning of 
the twentieth century, US presidents have often been able to deflect blame by appealing 
directly to the people over the heads of Congress (Tulis 1987). Some governments in Europe 
since 2008 tried, often unsuccessfully, to deflect blame to bankers and to external actors 
demanding austerity in return for loans. However, our results do not support the view that 
executive dominance alone means that governments can more easily deflect blame for such 
crises; neither does Tulis’ argument hold for the US Republican Party in 2008.  
It would seem to be an even taller order for governments to escape the consequences 
of rising societal expectations by trying to talk them down. Before 2008, successive 
governments over three decades in Britain and the United States sought both to limit the 
actual extent of state intervention in the market (especially in financial markets) and to lower 
expectations about government stabilization capacities. When the crisis hit, however, 
incumbent policymakers – albeit reluctantly – reverted to post-war type by intervening at 
great expense to stabilize the financial system and the real economy. To be sure, rescuing 
banks was often deeply unpopular, but political and policy elites felt they had little choice if 
they were to salvage their damaged reputations by preventing even worse economic 
consequences. Great expectations mean that incumbent governments are often caught on the 
horns of an acute political dilemma: almost certainly damned if they don’t intervene, and 
often damned when they do. 
This suggests that great expectations are deeply engrained in modern polities and that 
there is limited space for political leaders to shape the interpretation and activation of 
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collectively shared beliefs and expectations in the post-1945 era.30 Nevertheless, further 
research is needed to investigate the counterfactual of whether rates of partisan turnover after 
banking crises would have risen even more sharply after 1945 without the rise of 
neoliberalism in recent decades. Absent this, it would be claiming too much to describe rising 
societal expectations of government as an iron cage, but our argument implies that in 
combination with particular political institutions they have had powerful consequences. 
Further research is also needed to ascertain why great expectations seem to have been so 
“sticky”. This may be because they are strongly reinforced by material interest: as the stock 
of financial, housing and human capital assets possessed by the middle classes has risen in 
many countries over the course of the 20th century, so too has voters’ stake in stabilization 
policies and insurance mechanisms (Ansell 2008). Ultimately, our findings suggest that 
incumbents in political systems that fail to respond to the mass public impulses arising from 
these expectations may suffer from a legitimacy gap that deprives them of office (Seabrooke 
2007).  
30 On the sources of such agency, see Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin 1994. On its 
potential to shape potential policy narratives and to mobilize political coalitions, see Blyth 
2002 and Mahoney and Thelen 2010. 
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Sample 
 
Table A.1. R &R Crisis Measure Sample  
Argentina Mauritius 
Australia Mexico 
Austria Netherlands 
Belgium Nicaragua 
Bolivia Nigeria 
Brazil Norway 
Canada Panama 
Chile Paraguay 
Colombia Peru 
Denmark Philippines 
Dominican 
Republic Poland 
Ecuador Portugal 
El Salvador Romania 
Finland 
Russian 
Federation 
France South Africa 
Germany South Korea 
Ghana Spain 
Greece Sri Lanka 
Guatemala Sweden 
Honduras Switzerland 
Hungary Taiwan 
India Thailand 
Indonesia Turkey 
Ireland United Kingdom 
Italy United States 
Japan Uruguay 
Kenya Venezuela 
Malaysia Zambia 
 
Italicized countries have at least one incumbent spell in the pre-war sample (1831 – 1938).  
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Table A.2. L & V Crisis Measure Sample 
 
Albania Ghana New Zealand 
Argentina Greece Niger 
Armenia Guatemala Nigeria 
Australia Guinea-Bissau Norway 
Austria Honduras Pakistan 
Bangladesh Hungary Panama 
Belarus India Paraguay 
Belgium Indonesia Peru 
Benin Ireland Philippines 
Bolivia Israel Poland 
Botswana Italy Portugal 
Brazil Jamaica Romania 
Bulgaria Japan 
Russian 
Federation 
Burundi Kenya Senegal 
Canada Kyrgyzstan Sierra Leone 
Cape Verde Latvia Slovakia 
Chile Lebanon Slovenia 
Colombia Lesotho South Africa 
Comoros Liberia South Korea 
Costa Rica Lithuania Spain 
Croatia Luxembourg Sri Lanka 
Cyprus Macedonia Sudan 
Czech Republic Madagascar Sweden 
Denmark Malawi Switzerland 
Dominican 
Republic Malaysia Thailand 
Ecuador Mali 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
El Salvador Mauritius Turkey 
Estonia Mexico Ukraine 
Fiji Moldova United Kingdom 
Finland Mongolia United States 
France Montenegro Uruguay 
Gambia Nepal Venezuela 
Georgia Netherlands Zambia 
Germany 
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Summary Statistics 
 
Table A.3 provides the summary statistics for all variables used the analysis.  
 
Table A.3. Summary Statistics. 
 
R&R Crisis Measure Sample 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Partisan Spell 2844 7.69 14.566 0 111 
Banking Crisis 
(R&R) 
2844 0.112 0.316 0 1 
Veto Players 2844 0.428 0.122 0 0.72 
Democracy 2844 9.051 1.303 6 10 
Executive 
Dominance 
2844 0.232 0.422 0 1 
Growth 2844 3.409 4.765 -22.28 68.83 
GDP per capita 
(ln) 
2844 8.732 0.823 6.400 10.362 
Inflation (ln) 2415 1.704 1.376 -2.302 26.077 
Cumulative crises 2844 8.251 5.912 0 30 
 
L&V Crisis Measure Sample 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Partisan Spell 2326 6.064 12.20 0 111 
Banking Crisis 
(L&V) 
2326 0.088 0.283 0 1 
Veto Players 2326 0.404 0.138 0 0.72 
Democracy 2326 8.808 1.365 6 10 
Executive 
Dominance 
2326 0.254 0.435 0 1 
Growth 2326 3.464 3.854 -32.11 20.27 
GDP per capita 
(ln) 
2326 9.052 1.151 5.592 11.048 
Inflation (ln) 2326 1.873 1.257 -3.206 9.371 
Cumulative crises 2326 1.479 2.231 0 10 
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Partisan Spell Coding and Data Sources 
 
We identify the chief executive by cross-checking information from Archigos and 
rulers.org, a website that lists heads of state and government since the early 18th century.31 In 
systems with both a prime minister and a president or monarch, we identify the chief 
executive by using the coding rules provided in the Database of Political Institutions. These 
rules code a system as presidential if the president can veto legislation and the parliament 
needs a supermajority to override the veto, or if the president can appoint and dismiss the 
prime minister and dissolve parliament and call for new elections. We adapt this scheme to 
identify the chief executive in settings where a monarch is present, using information 
provided in the Comparative Constitutions Project, a cross-national historical dataset of 
written constitutions (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2012).32  
To identify partisan affiliation and voting systems we use information from a number of 
sources.33 The measurement of partisan spells is often fairly straightforward for both 
parliamentary and democratic executive-dominated systems. However, in parliamentary 
systems we code partisan spells as ending when the composition of governing coalitions 
changes even if the chief executive remains unchanged, such as Britain in 1931 and West 
Germany in 1966.  
 
31 Left-censoring does not compromise our analysis since these sources contain information 
about partisan survival prior to 1831 that we include in our partisan spell indicator.  
32 In cases where there was uncertainty or no clear institutional framework, we also cross-
checked our coding by consulting with country experts. 
33 Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer and Walsh 2001; Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2012; Mackie 
and Rose 1990, Nohlen 2005, Nohlen, Gotz, and Hartmann 2001, and Vanhanen 2000. 
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Veto Player Residuals 
 
Figures A.1 – A.4 use the coefficients from Models 2, 4, 6, and 8 of Table 1 in the main text 
to show the marginal effect of banking crisis on partisan survival conditional on veto players 
residuals.  
 
Figure A.1. Marginal Effect of Banking Crisis on Partisan Survival Conditional on Veto Players Residuals, 
1831- 2010.  
 
The median line summarizes the central tendency from the simulations. The ribbon represents the middle 95% 
of 1,000 simulations. The density of the ribbon represents the set of values with the highest probability. 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
Figure A.2. Marginal Effect of Banking Crisis on Partisan Survival Conditional on Veto Players Residuals, 
1831- 1938.  
 
 
The median line summarizes the central tendency from the simulations. The ribbon represents the middle 95% 
of 1,000 simulations. The density of the ribbon represents the set of values with the highest probability. 
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Figure A.3. Marginal Effect of Banking Crisis on Partisan Survival Conditional on Veto Players Residuals, 
1946 - 2010.  
 
 
The median line summarizes the central tendency from the simulations. The ribbon represents the middle 95% 
of 1,000 simulations. The density of the ribbon represents the set of values with the highest probability. 
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Figure A.4. Marginal Effect of Banking Crisis on Partisan Survival Conditional on Veto Players Residuals, 
1970 - 2011.  
 
 
The median line summarizes the central tendency from the simulations. The ribbon represents the middle 95% 
of 1,000 simulations. The density of the ribbon represents the set of values with the highest probability. 
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Entropy Balancing 
As noted in the main text, we find imbalance to exist for three covariates – growth, 
democracy, and inflation, for the R&R measure in the post-war era only and three covariates 
– growth, inflation, and cumulative crisis-years – for the L&V measure. The values for crisis 
versus tranquil spells are as follows: (1) Growth: 1.23 and 4.27 percent (p<.01) using R&R, 
and 0.54 percent and 3.29 percent (p<.01) using L&V; (2) Democracy: 8.69 and 9.08 using 
R&R (p<.05); (3) Inflation: 2.56 and 1.93 percent (p<.01) using R&R, and 2.67 percent and 
1.95 percent (p<.05) using L&V; and (4) Cumulative crisis-years: 2.61 and 1.35 using L&V 
(p<.01). We do not consider information across all years in the spell since this would include 
values that change partly as a result of a crisis. We use entropy balancing since it has been 
shown to outperform other data pre-processing procedures, while also requiring fewer 
assumptions and possessing more attractive statistical properties (Hainmueller 2012).  
Table A.4 provides summary statistics of the balance between the “treated” (banking 
crisis) and “control” (tranquil) units in the pre-weighted data set, and then in the post-
weighted data set. The reduction of the imbalance between treatment and control units is 
substantively large. Since the difference in means for all covariates is essentially eliminated 
in the weighted data set, we conclude that the balancing procedure produced greater covariate 
balance.  
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Table A.4. Balance Statistics. 
 
Growth – Reinhart and Rogoff 
Data Treatment 
Mean 
Treatment 
Variance 
Treatment 
Skewness 
Control 
Mean 
Control 
Variance 
Control 
Skewness 
Pre-Weighting 1.499 16.43 -0.7833 4.024 16.66 4.228 
Post-Weighting 1.499 16.43 -0.7833 1.499 25.38 -1.834 
 
Growth – Laeven and Valencia 
Data Treatment 
Mean 
Treatment 
Variance 
Treatment 
Skewness 
Control 
Mean 
Control 
Variance 
Control 
Skewness 
Pre-Weighting 0.8392 19.95 -0.8064 3.711 13.54 -1.001 
Post-Weighting 0.8392 19.95 -0.8064 0.8391 19.96 -1.07 
 
Democracy – Reinhart and Rogoff 
Data Treatment 
Mean 
Treatment 
Variance 
Treatment 
Skewness 
Control 
Mean 
Control 
Variance 
Control 
Skewness 
Pre-Weighting 8.744 1.768 -0.6586 9.092 1.572 -1.128 
Post-Weighting 8.744 1.768 -0.6586 8.744 2.045 -0.7053 
 
Inflation – Reinhart and Rogoff 
Data Treatment 
Mean 
Treatment 
Variance 
Treatment 
Skewness 
Control 
Mean 
Control 
Variance 
Control 
Skewness 
Pre-Weighting 2.165 2.855 1.029 1.696 1.409 0.6812 
Post-Weighting 2.165 2.855 1.029 2.165 2.045  1.022 
 
Inflation – Laeven and Valencia 
Data Treatment 
Mean 
Treatment 
Variance 
Treatment 
Skewness 
Control 
Mean 
Control 
Variance 
Control 
Skewness 
Pre-Weighting 2.24 3.26 0.9002 1.85 1.398 0.6305 
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Post-Weighting 2.24 3.26 0.9002 2.24 3.26 1.232 
 
Cumulative Crisis-Years – Laeven and Valencia 
Data Treatment 
Mean 
Treatment 
Variance 
Treatment 
Skewness 
Control 
Mean 
Control 
Variance 
Control 
Skewness 
Pre-Weighting 2.528 5.06 0.9036 1.336 4.872 1.667 
Post-Weighting 2.528 5.06 0.9036 2.509 5.06 0.3498 
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Table A.5 provides the results in the form of coefficients for different models of incumbency 
survival using entropy balancing and different measures of banking crises in the post-war 
period.  
Table A.5. Banking Crises and Partisan Spell Termination Using Entropy Balancing, 1946 – 2011.  
  1946 - 2010  1970 - 2011 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
          
Banking Crisis 0.244 0.602*** 0.315 0.382*** 
 
(0.452) (0.131) (0.386) (0.103) 
     Veto Players -1.527** 
 
-1.043* 
 
 
(0.740) 
 
(0.576) 
 
     Banking Crisis * 0.938 
 
0.179 
 Veto Players (1.087) 
 
(0.937) 
 
     Democracy 0.102 0.0774 0.0206 -0.00164 
 
(0.0669) (0.0651) (0.0590) (0.0563) 
     Executive Dominance -0.250 -0.253 -0.143 -0.142 
 
(0.158) (0.157) (0.159) (0.159) 
     Growth 0.0111 0.0106 -0.0184 -0.0185 
 
(0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0147) (0.0146) 
     GDP per capita (ln) -0.118 -0.118 0.0144 0.0147 
 
(0.107) (0.107) (0.0846) (0.0843) 
     Inflation (ln) 0.143** 0.142** 0.0800** 0.0796** 
 
(0.0574) (0.0575) (0.0399) (0.0402) 
     Cumulative crises -0.0153 -0.0153 0.0210 0.0211 
 
(0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0303) (0.0304) 
     Years Since Previous 0.00634 0.00618 0.0136** 0.0136** 
 Partisan Spell Termination (0.00400) (0.00403) (0.00609) (0.00608) 
     Count of Previous  0.00297 0.00306 0.000842 0.000833 
Partisan Spell Terminations (0.00484) (0.00482) (0.00572) (0.00572) 
     Veto Players Residual 
 
-1.521** 
 
-1.083* 
  
(0.750) 
 
(0.586) 
     Banking Crisis * 
 
0.903 
 
0.240 
Veto Players Residual 
 
(1.133) 
 
(0.960) 
     Constant -1.722* -2.084** -2.137*** -2.344*** 
 
(0.993) (1.029) (0.679) (0.686) 
     Observations 1997 1997 2326 2326 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Models 1 and 2 use the R&R banking crisis measure. Models 3 and 4 use the L&V banking crisis 
measure. 
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Recession Accelerator or Competency Shock? 
Table A.6 provides the results in the form of coefficients for different models of 
incumbency survival using different measures of banking crises without a recession in the 
post-war period.  
Table A.6. Banking Crises without Recession and Partisan Spell Termination, 1946- 2011.  
 
===================================================================== 
                                1946 – 2010   1970 – 2011 
                           Model 1    Model 2    Model 3    Model 4     
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Banking Crisis             -1.64 **    0.42 *     0.48       0.70 ***                    
                           (1.22)     (0.31)     (0.63)     (0.24)  
                   
Veto Players               -2.20 ***             -0.59                
                           (0.53)                (0.49)   
 
Banking Crisis *            5.46 ***              0.60                    
Veto Players               (1.55)                (1.45)  
 
Democracy                   0.19 **    0.15 *     0.00      -0.01     
                           (0.09)     (0.09)     (0.07)     (0.07)   
 
Executive Dominance        -0.68 ***  -0.68 ***  -0.56 ***  -0.56 *** 
                           (0.29)     (0.29)     (0.16)     (0.16)   
 
Growth                        ^  **      ^  **   -0.05 ***  -0.05 *** 
                                                 (0.02)     (0.02)  
 
GDP per capita (ln)        -0.41 ***  -0.42 ***  -0.09      -0.09                     
                           (0.16)     (0.16)     (0.11)     (0.11) 
 
Inflation                   0.23 **    0.22 **    0.07       0.07                     
                           (0.09)     (0.10)     (0.06)     (0.06)  
 
Cumulative Crises          -0.01      -0.01      -0.02      -0.02                     
                           (0.02)     (0.02)     (0.03)     (0.03)     
 
                                                             
Veto Players Residual                 -2.21 ***             -0.60     
                                      (0.53)                (0.49)    
 
Banking Crisis *                       5.87 ***              0.68          
Veto Players Residual                 (1.89)                (1.52)         
             
---------------------------------------------------------------------   
Events                      304        304        401        401        
Observations                1928       1928       2250       2250          
===================================================================== 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Splines (not shown) are included for Growth (Models 1 and 2). 
Models 1 and 2 use the R&R banking crisis measure. Models 3 and 4 use the L&V banking crisis 
measure. 
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Figures A.5 and A.6 show that the positive effect on the likelihood of partisan spell 
termination of a banking crisis remains statistically significant for high values of veto players 
residuals when we consider R&R and L&V crisis-years that do not coincide with a recession. 
The simulated risk ratios suggest the effect is substantively significant. Using the R&R 
measure, we find governments in high veto player environments facing crises without a 
recession to be 5.13 [1.87, 13.76] times more likely to suffer a partisan spell termination than 
a government in a tranquil environment. The L&V measure generates a risk ratio of 2.29 
[1.18, 4.78] for the same comparison. For both crisis measures the confidence intervals for 
risk ratios in high and low veto player environments do not fully overlap. 
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Figure A.5. Marginal Effect of Banking Crisis without a Recession on Partisan Survival Conditional on Veto 
Players Residuals, 1946- 2010. 
 
 
 
The median line summarizes the central tendency from the simulations. The ribbon represents the middle 95% 
of 1,000 simulations. The density of the ribbon represents the set of values with the highest probability. 
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Figure A.6. Marginal Effect of Banking Crisis without a Recession on Partisan Survival Conditional on Veto 
Players Residuals, 1970 - 2011. 
 
 
 
The median line summarizes the central tendency from the simulations. The ribbon represents the middle 95% 
of 1,000 simulations. The density of the ribbon represents the set of values with the highest probability. 
 
  
 67 
Recession Accelerator in the Pre-War Era? 
Table A.7 provides the results in the form of coefficients for different models of 
incumbency survival where growth is excluded. We find no evidence that banking crises 
alone or in combination with Veto Players (or its residual) has a significant influence on 
partisan spell termination in the pre-war era.  
Table A.7. Banking Crises and Partisan Spell Termination Excluding Growth, 1831 - 1938.  
        
 
Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 
        
Banking Crisis 0.0505 2.639 -0.0733 
 
(0.799) (5.845) (1.213) 
    Veto Players -2.507 -2.191 
 
 
(2.524) (2.015) 
 
    Banking Crisis * 
 
-5.533 
 Veto Players 
 
(12.25) 
 
    Democracy -0.142 -0.174 -0.190 
 
(0.0887) (0.123) (0.164) 
    GDP per capita (ln) -4.410*** -4.459*** -4.393*** 
 
(0.581) (0.618) (0.607) 
    Cumulative crises -0.200*** -0.200*** -0.202*** 
 
(0.0688) (0.0744) (0.0721) 
    Veto Players Residual 
  
-2.628 
   
(2.056) 
    Banking Crisis * 
  
1.721 
Veto Players Residual 
  
(8.598) 
    Events 147 147 147 
Observations 699 699 699 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Testing the U-Shaped Relationship 
 
 MacIntyre’s (2002) argument suggests a U-shaped relationship between the number 
of veto players and the costs of financial crises. If MacIntyre’s argument holds, then one 
would expect that environments with an intermediate number of constraints on the chief 
executive would be most conducive to incumbent survival in the aftermath of a banking 
crisis. As per subsequent quantitative tests of MacIntyre’s hypothesis (Angkinand and Willett 
2008; Hicken, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2005), we include a quadratic term of Veto Players 
and interact it with our banking crisis measures.  
Table A.8 reports the results. The coefficient for the interaction and the quadratic 
term, though positive, is insignificant in all models. To assess the form of the relationship, we 
use Figures A.7 – A.8 to plot the hazard ratio for crisis and tranquil countries across all 
observed values for Veto Players. These plots fail to confirm a U-shaped relationship.34  
  
34 We uncover a similar finding when we use the residual of Veto Players.  
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Table A.8. Banking Crises and Partisan Spell Termination Using Quadratic Term, 1946- 2011.  
  1946 -2010  1970 - 2011 
VARIABLES Model 1  Model 2 
      
Banking Crisis 1.451 0.818 
 
(1.969) (1.729) 
   Veto Players -2.167 -4.512** 
 
(3.156) (2.055) 
   Veto Players Squared 0.809 5.648** 
 
(4.197) (2.822) 
   Banking Crisis * -10.38 -5.409 
Veto Players (10.72) (8.537) 
   Banking Crisis * 17.45 8.259 
Veto Players Squared (14.11) (11.26) 
   Democracy 0.161 0.0489 
 
(0.134) (0.0721) 
   Executive Dominance -0.326 -0.541** 
 
(0.284) (0.218) 
   Growth -0.00610 -0.0347* 
 
(0.0233) (0.0200) 
   GDP per capita (ln) -0.203 -2.03e-05** 
 
(0.216) (1.02e-05) 
   Inflation (ln) 0.136 0.0131 
 
(0.110) (0.0757) 
   Cumulative crises -0.000825 -0.0484 
 
(0.0229) (0.0406) 
   Events 323 422 
Observations 1997 2326 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Models 1 uses the R&R banking crisis measure. Model 2 uses the L&V banking crisis measure. 
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Figure A.7. Hazard Ratio of Banking Crisis Conditional on Veto Player and Veto Players Squared, 1946 – 
2010 
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Figure A.8. Hazard Ratio of Banking Crisis Conditional on Veto Players and Veto Players Squared, 1970 – 
2011 
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